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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant
Tridentine

Latin

and
Rite

cross-respondent,
Catholic

Church

of

Corporation
Saint

of

Joseph

the
(the

"Church") agrees with much of respondents' statement of facts.
However, that statement must be clarified and supplemented in two
important respects.
First, by selectively extracting certain portions of
the testimony of Deputy Charles Ellis ("Deputy Ellis"), respondents attempt to give the impression that at the time he effected
personal service of the summons and complaint, Deputy Ellis had
no idea who he was serving.
assertion

(Respondents' Brief at 7-8). That

is, however, belied by a full and fair reading of

Deputy Ellis' testimony and that of the two
physically witnessed

his service of process.

individuals who
That testimony

makes clear that as Deputy Ellis and the two witnesses moved up
the driveway towards the front door of the Priory, they were
observed by a member of the Schuckardt Group who was immediately
and spontaneously identified by the two Church members as respondent Horwath

(Tr. 97, 98, 180, 181, 188, 189).

It further

reflects that Deputy Ellis identified himself to Horwath as a
police officer, announced his intent to serve the summons and
complaint and attempted to explain their contents.

(Tr. 97, 98,

180, 181).
Respondents, however, seek to invalidate Deputy Ellis
service of process by asserting the unremarkable fact that four

years after he effected service, Deputy Ellis " . . .. could not
describe Terry Horwath."
then claim

(Respondents' Brief at 7).

Respondents

that Deputy Ellis " . . . acknowledged

that Mr.

Horwath could have been any one of the people in the group and he
had no knowledge of which one was Horwath."

Id.

at 8.

That

assertion, however, completely ignores the unchallenged testimony
of Deputy Ellis during his redirect examination.

That testimony

is as follows:
Q.

(By Mr. Anderson, legal counsel for the
Church)
Deputy Ellis, you indicated
that apparently there was more than one
individual standing behind the door [of
the Priory], correct?

A.

They were in the doorway. The door was
open and they were standing in the
foyer, I guess you would call it.

Q.

And I believe you indicated in response
to Mr. Lord's question, that Mr. Horwath
could have been any one of those individuals; is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But were you relying on what Father
Pivarunas [one of the two witnesses
observing the service of process] told
you as to who Mr. Horwath was?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And is that basis upon which you believe
you served the papers on Mr. Horwath?

A.

Yes.

Q*

And that's so reflected in your return
of service?

A.

Yes.
-2-

(Tr. 111-12)•
respondents'

Thus, there is little or no factual support for
oblique

suggestion

that

personal

service

was

effected on any one other than respondent Horvath.
Next, respondents attempt to create the impression that
Deputy Ellis never informed anyone at the Priory " . . . that he
had a summons or complaint, what the nature of the 'civil papers'
were,

or

attempt

to

hand

them

to

anyone

at

the

door."

(Respondent's Brief at 8 ) . To support that remarkable assertion,
respondents cite pages 99 and 123 of the trial transcript. Id.
However, a careful review of those pages establishes that respondents'

reliance

on

page

99

completely

ignores

Deputy

Ellis'

testimony on pages 97 and 98 in which he explicitly stated that
he informed those in attendance at the Priory that he was " . . .
there

for

the

purpose

of

serving

civil

papers."

(Tr. 98).

Moreover, respondents' reliance on page 123 of the transcript is
disingenuous in that it reflects only the testimony of one of the
individuals
testified

at

the door

that Deputy

papers were."

of

the Priory

Ellis never

(respondent

told him

Krier) who

" . . .

what

the

Respondents can cite nothing in the transcript to

support their claim that Deputy Ellis never informed Horwath of
the substance of the papers that he attempted to serve.

Indeed,

it would be impossible for respondents to do so in light of their
inexplicable

failure to assure the attendance of Horwath

witness at trial.

-3-

as a

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
Washington

Substituted service of process is permitted under

law

if

personal service.

it is impractical

or

impossible

to effect

Specifically, Washington law is clear that if

a defendant cannot be found or has concealed himself so that
process cannot be served on him, substituted service is sufficient to acquire jurisdiction.
establishes

that

respondents

In this case, the record clearly
Schuckardt,

Belzak

and

Jacobs

secretly removed themselves from the Priory to avoid service of
process.

As such, substituted service by personal service on

respondent Horwath is valid.
2.
respondent

The

Church's

Horwath

Washington law.

complied

personal
fully

service

with

the

of

process

on

requirements

of

Specifically, Washington law does not require

that the process server actually physically place the summons and
complaint in the defendant's possession; rather, it only requires
that the server attempt to yield possession and control of the
documents while in a position to accomplish that act.

Because

Deputy Ellis sought to do just that, respondent Horwath's angry
refusal to accept the proffered papers cannot invalidate service
of process.
3.

In

cross

appealing

from

the

District

Court's

refusal to quash service as against respondents Horwath, Gorbet,
Krier and Boridin, respondents have failed to discharge their
burden of marshalling all of the evidence supporting the court's
-4-

factual findings that they were validly served.
dents

are

precluded

from

obtaining

any

As such, responrelief

on

their

cross-appeal.
4.

Under Washington law, an abode once acquired is

presumed to continue until the person asserting a change of abode
shows through clear and convincing evidence that he has acquired
a new and permanent abode.

In their brief, respondents have

completely failed to show any evidence in the record establishing
their acquisition of a new "usual abode" on the date service of
process was effected.

As such, under Washington law, the Priory

is presumed to continue as their usual abode, and substituted
service at the Priory was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over
them in Washington.
ARGUMENT
I.

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS IS PERMISSIBLE
IN ANY SITUATION WHERE IT IS IMPRACTICABLE OR
IMPOSSIBLE TO EFFECT PERSONAL SERVICE.
The law is well settled that:
"[substituted or constructive service of
process, if authorized by statute, may be had
where it is impracticable or impossible to
get actual personal service. The right to
resort to constructive service of process is
based on the ground of necessity, and it is
limited and restricted to cases where personal service cannot be had on a defendant,
either because he is a non-resident or
because, being a resident, he has gone out of
the state, or cannot be found, or has concealed himself so that process cannot be
served on him, and the validity of statues
providing therefor is generally held to

-5-

depend on the fact that the defendant, after
due diligence, cannot be found in the state,
62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process, Section 66, p. 846 (1972).
The Washington

courts have

held

that

the

issue of

whether or not a defendant has concealed himself so as to evade
process is a factual question.

Bethel v. Sturmer, 3 Wash. App.

862, 479 P.2d 131, 134 (1970).

And, "a clandestine or secret

removal from a known address appears necessary for concealment
under the statute."

Patrick v. DeYounq, 45 Wash. App. 103, 724

P.2d 1064, 1067 (Wash. 1986).

The rationale for granting a party

relief from another party's concealment is that:
In concealing himself, the defendant, by his
own action, renders personal service of
process impossible. This action constitutes
a waiver of notice of the proceedings sought
to be avoided.
.

. .

To allow a person to escape his civil obligations by purposely hiding himself would be to
encourage deception.
Clark v. LeBlanc, 92 N.M. 672, 593 P.2d 1075, 1076 (N.M. 1979).
In light of the foregoing principles, it is obvious
that substituted service was justified:

respondents Schuckardt,

Jacobs and Horwath fled from the Priory at which they had resided
for years to a motel in downtown Spokane

w

. . • for the purposes

of safety and to avoid any confrontation,"

Tr. 33, and they

purposely concealed from the Church any mention of their move

-6-

from the Priory to the motel (Tr. 55, 56).

If ever there was a

campaign of concealment, this is it.
Moreover, the days preceding

the attempt

to effect

service were punctuated by periodic exchanges of gunfire, verbal
taunts and threats between the Schuckardt Group and other members
of the Church.

(Tr. 24, 32, 35, 36, 55, 56, 66, 69, 72, 75, 85,

90, 91, 101, 113, 128 and 181).

In the final analysis, both

sides were acutely apprehensive of the threat of physical violence.

Ld.

As such, the process server's apprehension for his

own personal safety and that of the Church members accompanying
him established a compelling necessity for substituted service —
service calculated to minimize the risk of bloodshed.

As such,

the substituted service effected by Deputy Ellis suffers from
none of the infirmities suggested by respondents.
Finally, there is no support for respondents' assertion
that the trial testimony " . . .

raises a reasonable suspicion

that a deliberate attempt was made not to inform [respondents]
that a law suit had been commenced against them."
Brief at 17).

(Respondents'

That assertion is incredible in light of Bishop

Schuckardt's own testimony that he " . . . had heard rumors of a
complaint" having been filed against the Schuckardt Group, Tr.
41, and that some three weeks after the summonses and complaints
were served, Bishop Schuckardt issued a written decree excommunicating one of the Church's members, the grounds for which was
"summoning [the Schuckardt Group] before a lay tribunal, to which
-7-

there is attached an excommunication latae sententiae specifically reserved to the Holy See."
Therefore,

there

respondents' assertion

that

(Trial Ex. P-4).

is no

support

in

they were never

pendency of the Washington action.

the

record

apprised

for

of the

As such, they can mount no

due process objections to the sufficiency of process.
II • THE CHURCH'S PERSONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS ON
RESPONDENT HORWATH COMPLIED FULLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF WASHINGTON LAW.
Respondents contend in their brief that Deputy Ellis'
personal

service

of

the summons

and

complaint

Horwath was defective in two respects:
m

on

respondent

(i) that Deputy Ellis

• . . had no idea who he was serving" and (ii) that Deputy

Ellis " . . . never actually tendered the [summons and complaint]
to anyone."

(Respondents Brief at 22-28).

Those contentions are

without merit.
As demonstrated at pages 2-3, supra, at the time he
effected personal service on respondent Horwath, Deputy Ellis was
apprised of Horwath's identity and on that basis attempted to
physically deliver the summons and complaint as he stood at the
door of the Priory.

Again, it is crucial to note that at trial,

respondents never refuted Deputy Ellis1 testimony that he served
respondent Horwath on the basis of the contemporaneous identifications made by two members of the Church and that he reasonably
believed that service was being effected on Horwath.

-8-

(Tr. lllr

112).

That a process server would typically have no advance

knowledge of the actual

identity of the person whom

he was

seeking to serve is hardly surprising; respondents' efforts to
attempt to exploit that fact must be rejected.
Next, respondents suggest in their brief that personal
service on respondent Horwath was defective in that " . . . at no
time did he actually deliver or even tender the papers to anyone."

(Respondents1

Brief at 26).

That assertion, however,

completely ignores controlling Washington law that, to be effective,

service

does

not

actually

require

physically receive the proffered papers.

that

the

defendant

In the case of United

Pacific Insurance Company v. Discount Company, 15 Wash. App. 559,
550 P.2d 699 (1976), the court held that where one of the defendants slammed

the door, knocking the process papers from the

server's hand, defendants were validly served and the court had
jurisdiction over them.

The court stated:

The facts in the case at bench demonstrate a
clear attempt by the process server to yield
ossession and control of the documents to
the defendant] while he was positioned in a
manner to accomplish that act.
Normal
'delivery' thereof would have been effected
upon [the defendant] except for her obvious
attempt to evade service by slamming the door
after the papers had been held out to her.
The summons need not actually be placed in
the defendant's hand [for service to be
effective].

P

Id. at 701 (emphasis added).

-9-

In the case at bar, personal service on Horwath and
substitute service on the remaining parties was made by Deputy
Ellis' offering the documents to Horwath and then placing them
upon the p>orch of his residence after Horwath slammed the door.
(Tr. 97, 98, 180, 181).

In the words of United Pacific, Deputy

Ellis clearly attempted to "yield possession and control of the
documents to Horwath while he was positioned
accomplish that act.n

in a manner to

Horwath's extraordinary effort to evade

service of process by physically refusing to accept the proffered
papers cannot serve as a basis for invalidating service.

There-

fore, the district court properly concluded that personal service
on Horwath was validly effected

in conformity with Washington

law.
III. IN ASKING THIS COURT TO REVERSE THE DISTRICT
COURT'S REFUSAL TO QUASH SERVICE AS AGAINST
RESPONDENTS
HORWATH,
GORBET, KRIER
AND
BORIDIN. RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO DISCHARGE
THEIR BURDEN OF MARSHALLING ALL EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THAT CONCLUSION AND THE FINDING ON
WHICH IT IS BASED. AS SUCH, THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM OBTAINING ANY RELIEF ON APPEAL.
Fewer

principles

could

be

better

settled

than

the

proposition that on appellate review the findings of fact and
judgment of the trial court are presumed to be valid and correct
and the heavy burden of establishing error rests with the appellant.

Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d

743, 747, (Utah 1982); Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah
1981).

And, upon review, "this court views the evidence and all

-10-

the inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light
most supportive of the trial court's findings.

Horton v. Horton.

695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984).
Unless clearly erroneous, findings of fact will not be
set aside, and, if there is a reasonable basis in evidence, the
findings will be affirmed on appeal.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a);

Katzenberqer v. State, 735 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1987).

Findings

will not disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of
the evidence or unless

it manifestly

misapplied the law to established

appears that

facts.

the court

Brown v. Board of

Education of Morgan County School District, 560, P.2d 1129 (Utah
1977).
The heavy burden imposed upon an appellant has been
cogently expressed by the Utah Supreme Court as follows:
It is incumbent upon the appellant to
marshall all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings and demonstrate
even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the factual determinations made by the
trial court, that the evidence is insufficient to support its finding.
Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986).

Accord,

Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
In this case, respondents are seeking to challenge the
district

court's

factual

findings and

legal conclusions with

respect to respondents Horwath, Gorbet, Krier and Boridin.

In

doing so, however, respondents have nowhere set forth the evidence upon which the district court based those determinations.
-11-

Thus, respondents have failed

to even colorably marshall the

facts and demonstrate that even when viewed in the light most
favorable to their affirmance, they are clearly erroneous.

There

is, accordingly, no basis upon which those findings and conclusions can be challenged on appeal.
IV.

RESPONDENTS HAVE COMPLETELY FAILED TO SHOW
IN THE RECORD ESTABLISHING THEIR
ANY EVIDENCE
:
ACQU ISITION OF A NEW "USUAL ABODE" ON THE
DATE SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS ... EFFECTED, AS
REQUIRED BY WASHINGTON LAW.
As

the

Church

has demonstrated

in

its

appellant's

brief, an abode once acquired is presumed to continue until the
person asserting

a change from that abode shows that he has

acquired a new permanent abode.

(Appellant's Brief at 11-12);

see also Northwestern and Pacific Hypotheek Bank v. Ridpathy 29
Wash. €87, 70 P.2d 139, 147 (1902).

In their response to the

Church's brief, respondents have completely ignored this vital,
dispositive issue.

Their decision to do so is understandable in

light of the fact that although each member of the Schuckardt
Group

testified

that

after

his purported

departure

from the

Priory, he moved to reestablish the religious order in Northern
California, there is absolutely no evidence as to precisely when
that move occurred.

See e.g., Tr. 39, 55, 84, 124, 125, 152,

153, and 158). Specifically, there is no evidence that as of the
date the summonses and complaints were served —

June 8, 1984 —

any member of the Schuckardt Group had acquired a new "usual
abode."
•12-

While the trial transcript reflects repeated references
to this move, a careful review of those references discloses no
indication that any member of the Schuckardt Group considered
California or any other location his new usual abode as of June
8, 1984.

Therefore, under the Ridpath principle —

that once

established, an abode is presumed to continue until it is shown
that a new permanent abode has been acquired —
utterly failed to discharge their burden.

respondents have

As such, the district

court clearly erred in failing to make any findings as to what
the new supposed abode was as of the date service was effected.
The district court further erred in concluding that respondents'
usual place of abode was anything other than the Priory —

the

site at which they had continuously resided for the two to four
years preceding service of process.
Accordingly,

this Court should

reverse the district

court's findings that the Priory was not the usual place of abode
of respondents Schuckardt, Jacobs and Belzak and enter judgment
as a matter of law that substituted service on those respondents
at the Priory was validly effected.

On that basis, the Washing-

ton Judgment must be enforced.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the Church's
appellant's brief, this Court should

(i) reverse the district

court' judgment with respect to respondents, Schuckardt, Belzak
and

Jacobs,

(ii)

affirm

the
-13-

judgment

with

respect

to

cross-appellants,

Horwath,

Krier,

Gorbet

and

Boridin,

and

(iii) remand this case to the district court with instructions to
enforce the Washington Judgment as a matter of law.
DATED this

^

day of June, 1989.
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JohnvT. Anderson
Attorneys for Appellant
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